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I.

INTRODUCTION

VI.

Influential futurist Ithiel de Sola Pool wrote:
For copyright, the implications [of electronic publishing] are
fundamental. Established notions about copyright become obsolete,.
rooted as they are in the technology of print. The recognition of a
copyright and the practice of paying royalties emerged with the
printing press. With the arrival of electronic reproduction, these
practices become unworkable. Electronic publishing is analogous not
so much to the print shop of the eighteenth century as to word-ofmouth communication, to which copyright was never applied.'
The emergence of electronic networks has undeniably placed
significant pressure on our existing intellectual property system. As With
each new technological advance, copyright law must adjust to fit the new
circumstances presented by the Internet. Until law and technology reach
an equilibrium, many predict that intellectual property creators will be
reluctant to create works for the Internet environment since creators will
be unable to protect their copyright interests.2 Others have argued that
only minor adjustments are necessary to fit copyright law to electronic

1. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 214 (1983).

2. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10-11 (1995) [hereinafter NII WHrrE
PAPER], available at <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii>; Ken Kay- &
Steve Metalitz, Copyright Act Needs Digital Expansion, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996

<http://www.cic.org/clip5.html>; Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, SCI. AM., Mar. 1997
<http://www.sciam.com/0397issue/0397stefik.html> ("Uncontrolled copying has shifted
the balance in the social contract between creators and consumers of digital works to the
extent that most publishers and authors do not release their best work in digital form.").
[Throughout this article, websites are referenced as both primary and secondary
sources. Unless otherwise noted, all websites were verified on May 1, 1995.]
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networks such as the Internet.3 Still others-a distinct minority-believe
that copyright law has become less important in the age of electronic
networks, and that production of intellectual property will continue
unabated even without powerful copyright rights.
Unlike Professor Pool, we have the benefit of a few years of
empirical evidence to draw upon in analyzing the effects of electronic
networks on intellectual property. This article analyzes some of the
lessons we have learned in the commercial Internet's toddler years to
glean some insights into the implications for copyright law and Internetbased commerce. After analyzing recent economic, business, sociological
and technological developments, this article concludes that, while
copyright law .has a role to play on the Internet, other developments
overshadow copyright law as a tool for conforming behavior such that
copyright law may be unimportant to the Internet. The public policy
implications are clear: the business models, sociology and technology of
the Internet are evolving so rapidly that efforts to conform copyright law
to this environment would be detrimental.
Part II summarizes a few basic points of U.S. copyright law. Part ll
describes specific threats that the Internet poses to the enforcement of
rights under copyright law. Part IV analyzes the economics of electronic
networks to identify why intellectual property might be created even in a
putatively anarchistic, piracy-infested environment such as the Internet.
Part V discusses sociological attitudes towards intellectual property on
the Internet, identifying why it will be difficult to conform behavior on the
Internet to the strict letter of existing copyright laws. Part VI discusses
technologies that copyright holders can use in the battle over works
subject to copyright. Finally, part VII concludes with thoughts about how
we can live in a world where copyright laws are not the primary influence
on our behavior towards intellectual property.

3. NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 17. However, criticism of the NII WHITE PAPER has
been widespread, with commentators arguing that its proposed changes are not minor. See,
e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134, available at
Digital Future
<http://www.hotwired.com/wired7[4.01/features/white.paper.html>;
Coalition.<http://www.ari.net/dfc>.
Although this article focuses on the Internet, much of the analysis applies with equal
force to other networks such as BBSs and on-line services.
. 4. See John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: the Economy of Mind on the
Global Net (a.k.a. The Economy of Ideas), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 85, available at
("Intellectual
<http: //www.hotwired.com/wired/2.03/features/economy.ideas.html>
property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to contain digitized expression
any more than real estate law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting
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UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW BASICS 5

Many excellent summaries of U.S. copyright law exist,6 and this
section will not attempt to duplicate those efforts. However, mapping
out the basic contours of the existing U.S. copyright law scheme is helpful
in understanding the import of the conclusions of this article.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to establish a legislative
scheme "to promote Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors... the exclusive right to their.., writings...."'
In
response, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909, which it later
replaced with the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Copyright Act").8
The Copyright Act governs original works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. While the standard for
originality is low, facts and ideas may not be copyrighted.'
For
copyrightable works, the owner has the following exclusive rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work
10
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
These exclusive rights are subject to numerous restrictions. First, in
the case of works created after January 1, 1978, these rights cease 50
years after the death of the author, or, in the case of works made for hire,
the earlier of 75 years from the date of first publication or 100 years from
the date of creation."

spectrum..."); Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136, available at
<http: / /www.hotwired.com/wired/3.07/features/dyson.html>.

° 5. This article discusses only U.S. copyright law, although other copyright law schemes
are similarly worthy of analysis.
6. See, e.g., Ni WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 19-147; Terry Carroll, Frequently Asked
Questions Aboit Copyright, version 1.1.3, January 6, 1994 <http://www.eff.org/pub/
intellectual-property/copyright.faq>.
7. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994).
9. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 340 (1991), available
at <http://www.seamless.com/rcl/feist.html.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
11. Id. § 302.
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Second, these exclusive rights are subject to the doctrine of fair use,
which may permit the infringement of an exclusive right of a copyright
owner if its conditions are met. The Copyright Act enumerates four
factors that are to be considered to determine whether or not a use is fair:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of
12
the copyrighted work.
In evaluating a claim of fair use, the court is to consider all four
factors. However, taking 100 percent of a copyrighted work ordinarily
militates against a finding of fair use, 3 and the fourth factor is generally
14
considered the most important.
There are numerous other statutory exceptions and limitations to
copyright owners' rights, generally set out in Sections 108 to 120 of the
Copyright Act.
Other intellectual property rights in U.S. law often also apply to
works for which copyright protection is sought, including trade secret
rights, trademark rights, patent rights, rights of publicity, and rights of
privacy. While these other forms of intellectual property are not
addressed in this paper, collectively they form an important additional
basket of rights available to creators of intellectual property.
III.

THREATS TO ENFORCING COPYRIGHT RIGHTS ON THE
,INTERNET
This section describes some of the unique ways that the Internet
poses a threat to copyright owners' ability to enforce their copyrights.
A.

No Loss of Quality In Reproduction
Unlike copies of intellectual property made using analog copiers
(such as photocopy machines, video and music tape recorders, facsimile
machines and others), digital copies of intellectual property produce
perfect copies without any loss of quality. The first generation and the
1000th generation copy of digital material are indistinguishable. Since
each copy is a perfect copy, no quality-related limits inhibit pirates from
making as many copies as they please, and recipients of these copies

12. Id. § 107.
13. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).
14. See NII WHiTE PAPER, supra note 2, at 79.
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have no incentive to return to authorized sources to get another copy
equal in quality to the original version.
B.

No Meaningful Marginal Costs of Reproduction or
Distribution

Unlike the business of selling and distributing physical copies of
books, magazines, music cassettes or CDs, video cassettes or software,
the costs of making one extra copy of intellectual property on-line are
insignificant, as are the distribution costs associated with moving that
copy to the end user over the Internet. Assuming no per-byte or other
volume costs are imposed on the site owner (which is the current state of
the market), infringement can occur at virtually no marginal cost.
C.

Ability to Act Anonymously

Using anonymous remailers and other existing technologies, pirates
are able to act anonymously on-line, leaving no traceable trail of activity.
Anonymity poses a significant threat on the Internet, because it
theoretically allows pirates to cause harm without bearing any risk of
loss, thus undermining the general presumption that those causing harm
can be forced to internalize the costs of their actions. As a result, more
infringement is likely to occur than if costs were properly internalized:
However, anonymous activity is not a copyright-specific problem; it
applies to all crimes and torts that can be committed on-line. Therefore,
it may be more appropriate to address the harm caused by anonymity
generally, rather than drafting a specific resolution applicable only to
losses suffered by copyright owners. Furthermore, there is a built-in
limitation to the scope and size of anonymous actions, particularly if any
element of the activity is commercial; at a certain point the activity
should become large enough to leave at least shreds of evidence, both in
physical space and cyberspace, sufficient to allow attribution. 5
D.

Uneducated Users

Many users do not understand the existing copyright legal
framework. 6 While the lack of user education applies in both physical

15. Lance Rose, The Emperor's Clothes Still Fit Just Fine, WIRED, Feb. 1995, at 103, 104,
See
available at <http://www.hotwired.com/wired/3.02/departments/rose.if.html>;
Philip E. Ross, Cops Versus Robbers in Cyberspace, FORBES, Sept. 9, 1996, at 134, 137,
(noting that
available at <http://www.forbes.com/forbes/090996/5806134a.htm>
"[intellectual] property owners rely heavily on old-fashioned methods: police raids,
lawsuits and tip-offs," all of which become more likely as the size of the venture increases).
16. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, at
50-51 (1994), available at <http://yul.yu.edu:80/csl/journals/aelj/articles/13-1/
litman.html> ("The current copyright statute has proved to be remarkably education-
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space and cyberspace, the Internet permits these users to widely
disseminate works with relative ease. Often times, this publication can
inadvertently cause harm, such as the forwarding of works subject to
copyright to third parties. The result may be a number of relatively small
infringements that, in the aggregate, can lead to significant losses for
copyright holders.
E.

Conclusion
The foregoing threats indicate that copyright holders face
substantial risks on-line. Nevertheless, we already have ample evidence
that intellectual property is still being created for distribution on the
Internet.
Indeed, a staggering-almost unmanageable-quantity of
intellectual property continues to be produced and made available on-line
despite these threats. 7 Therefore, despite the assertions of those who
believe that the threats posed on-line to copyrighted works would result
in disincentives to create and distribute works, it appears other forces are
at work on the Internet.
IV.

ECONOMICS AND THE INTERNET

This section applies economic theory and surveys existing business
models to suggest why, without increased copyright protection,
intellectual property is still likely to be produced even if it is given away
on the Internet.
A.

Price-Setting Behavior in a Nearly Efficient Marketplace
When Marginal Costs Are Meaningfully Zero
The Internet is not a perfectly efficient market, but it does represent
a close approximation. Among the requirements for an efficient market
are perfect information and zero transaction costs. First, while the
Internet does not offer perfect information, some industries provide
enough information on the Internet to give buyers an opportunity to
compare prices based on nearly perfect information.1 8 On the Internet, it

resistant.... [Our current copyright statute could not be taught in elementary school,
because elementary school students couldn't understand it. Indeed, their teachers couldn't
understand it. Copyright lawyers don't understand it.").
17. See Steve G. Steinberg, Seek and Ye Shall Find (Maybe), WIRED, May 1996, at 108,
available at <http: / /www.hotwired.com/wired/4.05/features/indexweb.html> (noting
that "at its current growth rate, the Web will contain more words than the giant LexisNexis database by [summer 19961, and more than today's Library of Congress by the end of
1998").
18. See Netbot <http://www.netbot.com/>.
For example, the Internet provides
numerous "agents" for buying music CDs. These agents search the available pricing
databases on the Internet and deliver a comprehensive set of results, allowing customers to
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is likely that many additional industries will experience this phenomenon.
Second, while transaction costs are not zero, the Internet has significantly
reduced transaction costs. In particular, buyers may experience no
marginal transaction costs attributable to using the Internet for finding
purchasing opportunities or consummating a transaction. 19
In an efficient marketplace, a firm's profit-maximizing price is the
price where marginal revenue from each sale of the product equals the
marginal costs of the product.2" If marginal costs are zero, what is the
profit maximizing price?
1.
MARGINAL COSTS ON THE INTERNET
For many intellectual property creators, the marginal cost of each
additional "sale" of the intellectual property is likely to be effectively
zero. While many costs are associated with producing intellectual
property, including the time of the creator and the Internet infrastructure
(such as the hardware, software and Internet connection), these costs
become fixed costs once the intellectual property is produced. 2 At that
point, if the intellectual property is uploaded to the Internet, the
remaining costs are trivial-further reproduction or distribution on the
Internet imposes no meaningful marginal costs.
2.

OPTIMAL PRICING

Economic theory predicts that if the marginal costs to "selling"
intellectual property is zero, then some producers will accept zero
marginal revenues. In other words, the profit-maximizing price for theses
producers will be zero. Since this is a seemingly anomalous result, how
can this be explained?
There are at least four different possible
explanations:

easily compare prices and, presumably, choose the lowest. See, e.g., BargainFinder Agent
<http://bf.cstar.ac.com/bf/>.
19. See part III.B supra. In part, transaction costs are limited due to current market
conditions of pricing for access that does not vary with usage. There has been mudh
discussion suggesting that per-byte or per-unit pricing will be required because of the
problems inherent in a system where users can get unlimited use of the scarce resources of
the Internet without paying marginal costs. See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Hal R. Varian,
Economic FAQs About the Internet (une
1995) <http://www.spp.umich.edu/
ipps/papers/info-nets/EconomicFAQs/FAQs/FAQs.html>.
20. A producer will continue to produce so long as the marginal revenue from an
additionafunit of output is greater the marginal cost of such output, since the difference
represents a contribution towards fixed costs. In an efficient market, the party with the
lowest marginal cost sets the price, since it is able to undercut its competitors' prices and
therefore win customers.
21. In the long run, all costs are variable costs. However, in the short run, costs that
cannot be varied easily are fixed costs. Therefore, costs such as salaries, hardware and
software expenses and contractual commitments for Internet service are all fixed costs in
the short run.

1997

RENAISSANCE IN CYBERSPACE

(i) A zero-revenue pricing strategy may persist only in the short run;
but, ultimately, because no profits are being made, all producers will exit
this business. This is fundamentally the assertion of those who believe
that intellectual property owners must be paid directly for their creative
efforts, or else they will not produce.2 2
(ii) The only sustainable pricing strategy may be a scheme involving
price discrimination, where prices are set in accordance with users'
willingness to pay. In this situation, intellectual property will be offered
23
at varying prices, including possibly free, depending on the user.
(iii) Traditional economic theory may break down on the Internet so
that intellectual property will not be offered for free despite the absence
of marginal variable costs. If this were true, the profit-maximizing price
may not be where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. This would be a
rather profound result, implicating large chunks of existing economic
theory.
(iv) Finally, the profit-maximizing price on the Internet may be
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost because intellectual property
will be cross-subsidized by other products in a manner sufficient to cover
the fixed costs associated with intellectual property creation and
distribution. If this is true, a market price of zero for intellectual property
can still create long-term economic profits attributable to intellectual
property creation.
Of the four possible explanations, as explained in the remainder of
this part IV, the author believes that the last proposition best explains
why the production and distribution of intellectual property will continue
even in the absence of marginal revenues directly attributable to users of
the intellectual property.
The remainder of this part IV will discuss why the last theory is at
least supportable when it comes to many categories of intellectual
property on the Internet.
B.

Cross-subsidization of Intellectual Property Creation
There is nothing new about the proposition that vendors may give
away X to sell Y. In the classic formulation of its strategy, Gillette is
credited with conceiving the business model of giving away razors to sell

22. See, e.g., James Gleick, I'll Take the Money, Thanks, NEW YoRK TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug.
4, 1996, at 16, available at <http://www.around.com/copyright.html>.
23. See Hal R. Varian, Differential Pricing and Efficiency (June 1996) <http://
alfred.sims.berkeley.edu/Different/different.htn> (arguing that it is optimal for
intellectual property to be offered on a price-discriminated basis). Price discrimination is
tricky because it requires careful definition of the product beingprice-discriminated. If the
business
model to
ado
pted
by goods
an Internet
company is to provide free intellectual property as
an
inducement
sell
other
or services,
is the product" the intellectual property or
the package of intellectual property plus the ancillary goods or services?
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its blades.24 However, the deployment of this strategy is inherently
limited because a razor is a tangible "thing" that will always have
marginal costs to produce. On the Internet, where the marginal costs of
reproduction and distribution of intellectual property are effectively zero,
cross-subsidization becomes viable for a significantly greater number of
products.
An intellectual property owner can use a myriad of alternative
business models to extract value from the free distribution of intellectual
property. If successful, these business models will permit the crosssubsidization of intellectual property creation. Internet entrepreneurs will
be induced to create intellectual property if they are able to use it to make
a profit from alternative revenue sources.2 5
The remainder of part IV.B provides a survey of Internet-based
cross-subsidization models that may support the production of
intellectual property designed to be given away freely.
1.
ADVERTISING
Advertising is one of the highest-profile business models on the
Internet. Under the advertising model, a company gives away intellectual
property to attract visitors to its site and then sells advertising space on
its site to others. A broad range of companies are launching advertisingbased attempts to freely give away intellectual property and substantive
services, including email accounts, 26 interactive news agents, 27 editorial
periodicals28 and search engines and indexes.29

24. See Robert Metz, Shaking the Money Tree (Nov. 4, 1996) <http://www.talks.com/
library/rm1 10496.html>.
25. It is generally believed that few, if any, Internet businesses are currently making a
profit. See, e.g., Kathy Rebello, Making Money on the Net, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 27, 1996,.at 104,
available at <http://www.businessweek.com/1996/39/b34941.htm> (indicating that
Internet businesses losing money outnumber moneymakers two to one); See Jeff Moad, Web
Shakeout, PC WEEK, July 15,. 1996, at El, available at <http://www8.zdnet.com/
pcweek/ExecConnect/0715/15emain.html> (describing a numdber of high-profile failures
of Internet businesses). This limited empirical evidence does not yet prove that the Internet
will provide insufficient profits to induce the creation of intellectual property. The
Internet is far from mature, either as a commercial environment or in terms of the
predictability its technical or legal framework. Further, in most industries, significant
upfront investments must be made before profits accrue-and most Internet businesses are
less than 3 years old. Instead, the high stock valuations of many Internet companies
indicates that many investors forecast significant future profits.
26. See, e.g., Juno On-line <http://www.juno.com> and Hotmail <http://
www.hotmail.com>. Other companies, such as Cyber FreeWay <http://cyberfreeway.net>
and @bigger.net <http://bigger.net> are offering lifetime email accounts for a low one-time
fee. However, Freemark, one of the early entrants in this arena, has already gone defunct.
27. See, e.g, Pointcast Network <http://www.pointcast.com>, Freeloader <http://
www.freeloader.com> and Mercury Mail <http://www.merc.com/>.
28. See, e.g., HotWired <http://www.hotwired.com> and C INet <www.cnet.com>.
29. See, e.g., HotBot <http://www.hotbot.com/>, Yahoo! <http://www.yahoo.com>,
Excite <http://www.excite.com>, InfoSeek <http://www.infoSeek.com>, Switchboard
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However, the slow increase in Internet advertising dollars suggests
that, in the short run, advertising revenue may be insufficient to support
the level of free distribution of intellectual property that exists today.3 °
Because the supply of advertisement placement opportunities exceeds the
demand of advertisers, advertisers are becoming more demanding.3
Moreover, Internet users have grown weary of the often annoying banner
advertisements.
Nevertheless, the results obtainable from on-line
advertising can be so compelling that certain advertisers have strong
32
incentives to choose Internet advertising over other media.
Furthermore, other media industries indicate that multi-billion dollar
industries can be built primarily on advertising. For example, the multibillion dollar broadcast TV industry effectively gives away its intellectual
property to viewers, supporting itself almost exclusively on advertising.
The television broadcasting model is consistent with the contention that
Internet users will not be required to pay for intellectual property, and
that the production of intellectual property can be entirely supported by
advertising.
In reality, many intellectual property owners will combine the
advertising model with other forms of ancillary revenues.3 3 Nevertheless,
advertising remains a critically important component of Internet crosssubsidization business models.

<http://www.switchboard.com>, Four1l <http://www.fourll.com> and BigBook
<http: //www.bigbook.com/>.
30. See Lauren Gibbons Paul, Web Rewards Wait Only for the Patient,PC WEEK, July 15,
1996,
at
E4, available
at
<http:/ /www8.zdnet.com/pcweek/archive /1328 /
pcwk0007.htm> (suggesting that content sites should not expect to break even before the
year 2000); Rosalind Resnick, Follow the Money, INTERNET WORLD, May 1996, at 34, 34-36
hereinafter Resnick, Follow the Money], available at <http://www.iw.com/1996/05/
money.html> (noting that advertising revenue is heavily concentrated among a small number
of sites, leaving few advertising dolars for other sites); See also Hunter Madsen, Reclaim
the Deadzone, WIRED, Dec. 1996, at 206, 212, available at <http://www.wired.com/
wired/4.12/esmadsen.htm1> (describing how the limited real estate for banner
advertisements suggests that banner advertisements will be insufficient to support Web
publishing). Web advertisement revenues were $71.7 million in the first six months of 1996,
although they are expected to increase to $5 billion in 2000. Rebello, supra note 25, at 107.
31. See Zachary Schiller, For More About Tide, Click Here, Bus. WEEK, June 3, 1996, at
44, available at <http://www.businessweek.com/1996/23/b3478129.htm> (describing
how Procter & Gamble, America's largest advertiser, has attempted to pay based solely on
click-through rates, not page impressions).
32. See Craig R. Evans, The Web's REAL Opportunity-Advertising!, ELEC. RETAILING,
Sept./Oct. 1996, at 6 (describing a survey of Web users indicating that 46% of those who
used the Web to research products and services went on to buy the product at retail).
33. See Rosalind Resnick, AdTech '96: Is Banner Advertising Dead?, INTERACTWE PUBL'G
ALERT, July 1, 1996 <http://www.netcreations.com/ipa/banners.html>
[hereinafter
Resnick, Banner Advertising] (describing "sponsored content," "targeted direct mail" and
"pay-per-use" advertising strategies).
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2.

SPONSORSHIPS
A variant on the advertising model, sponsorship is the "cobranding" of intellectual property with the sponsor's trademarks. In the
old days of television, sponsorship was common; companies would
purchase all of the advertising for a show and be acknowledged as the
On-line, sponsorship can take many forms, but the
sponsor.3 4
fundamental premise is that the sponsor will be more integrated with the
content than just sticking its banner ad at the top of the page. For
example, Riddler <http://www.riddler.com/home/html> promotes a
contest which gives rewards to participants who can answer riddles that
require the participants to visit sponsors' sites.35
Sponsorship is emerging as a strong alternative to banner
advertising, at least partly due to advertisers' dissatisfaction with the
results from banner advertising. 36 However, sponsored content also
raises difficult issues about editorial integrity as the line between
advertisement and editorial information becomes blurred.
3.

"TRY BEFORE YOU BUY"

In the "try before you buy" model, companies provide consumers
with a free copy of a work which is limited in some way (such as
duration or functionality) in the hopes that the consumers will purchase a
full copy. For example, a vendor may give away software in the hopes
that recipients will return to purchase a copy. Moreover, in many
instances consumers may unilaterally pirate works and then later decide
to purchase legitimate copies, even though the vendor never intended to
provide "try before you buy" copies. 37 On the Internet, the "try before
you buy" model has become extremely popular, in part because no
meaningful marginal costs are associated with manufacturing or
distributing trial copies. Thus, software,3 8 content3 9 and subscription
services 40 are routinely given away on a "try before you buy" basis.

34. Madsen, supra note 30, at 220.
35. In another example, IBM makes the full text of patents issued to it since 1971
available for free on its website. IBM's motivation is, in part, to reinforce the message that
IBM has received more patents than anyone else for the past several years. See IBM Patent
Server <http://patent.womplex.ibm.com/>.
36. Resnick, Banner Advertising, supra note 33.

37. See Margie Wylie, Can Copyright Survive the Digital Age? Should It?, DIGrrAL
MEDIA: A SEYBOLD REPORT, July 3, 1995 (on file with author) ("'Some of the more popular
spreadsheet and wordprocessing programs were greatly aided by being ripped off to a
certain degree.' It let people use them enough that they were convinced it was worth the
money to bu a legitimate copy, with documentation, support and upgrades." (quoting R.W.
Lucky of Belcore Labs)).
38. This model is exemplified by the long-standing "shareware" industry. See, e.g.,
McAfee, <http://www.mcafee.com>, which makes anti-virus shareware software, and
Netscape <http://www.netscape.com>, which gives its browser away as shareware. Id
Software, the makers of Doom II, a popular (and violent) computer game, took a slightly
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4.

SALES OF UPGRADES

Under the sale of upgrades model, consumers are freely given
intellectual property with the expectation that some of them will
purchase a superior version. In some ways a variant of the "try before
you buy" model, this model capitalizes on the fact that version 1.0 of a
product can be the best device to sell version 2.0. For example, sales of
upgrades are ubiquitous in the modem software business, where
companies bundle their "lite" version of software with the modem for free
in the hope that consumers will upgrade to the "professional" version.
However, the model is not limited to software; an author might give away
a short story as a way to build demand for a "further adventures" sequel
story or the movie.4 1
5.

SALE OF COMPLEMENTARY TECHNOLOGY

The truest application of Gillette's maxim, the Internet version might
For
be "give away the client software to sell the server software."
example, the Internet's "browser software wars" have focused heavily on
the free distribution of client software. With a large installed base of
client software, the server software-which is sold and provides added
functionality for people using the client software-becomes more
attractive. More generally, software companies who also have hardware
businesses may give away software to encourage the use of
complementary proprietary hardware.4 2
6.

SALES OF PHYSICAL GOODS

Companies may use the free distribution of intellectual property to
foster the sale of physical goods in many ways. For example, Digital
initially intended to popularize its Alta Vista search engine in order to

different approach-they gave away the first 3 basic "levels" of the Doom II dungeon; the
other 47 levels were made available for a charge.
39. Numerous pornography sites on the Internet offer a few free photos for browsing as
See generally
a teaser to purchasing access to the remaining database of photos.
<http:www.yahoo.com/Society andCulture/Sexuality>.
40. See, e.g., the Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition <http://www.wsj.com>, which
offers a free two-week trial subscription.
41. See Paulina Borsook, Steal This Article, UPSIDE, Mar. 1996 at 80. 88 [hereinafter
Borsook, Steal This Article], available at <http://www.upside.com/texis/archive/
search/article.html?UID=9603011002> (describing how music groups have a love/hate
relationship with their underground fans, knowing that infringement by the underground is
Spectrum Press <http://users.aol.com/
often a way to expand their fan base).
specpress/free.htt> gives away samples of short stories and novels that it sells in
electronic form delivered on floppy disks. But see id. ( "You can upgrade software, not
music.'" (quoting Judith Saffer, in house attorney for BMI)).

42. See Caryn Gillooly, Cabletron'sUnbeatable Price Plan, INFO. WEEK, July 24, 1995, at

28 (describing how Cabletron was giving away its Spectrum software, worth $20,000, as
an entree to sell its other network management products).
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showcase the speed of its Alpha servers.4 3 Digital thus intended to give
away a search tool as a way to enhance sales of its physical goods.
Similarly, in the area of character merchandising, many companies may
seek to build character awareness on-line through free distribution of
character-related content; the increased character awareness may
translate into increased demand for character-branded merchandise.4 4
Finally, electronic distribution of intellectual property could be used to
create demand for physical copies of intellectual property that have been
bolstered with additional content or experience-enhancing elements.4 5
7.

SALES OF SERVICES

Companies may stimulate demand for services by distributing free
intellectual property on-line. For example, consultants may find it
relatively easy to attract potential customers by distributing free content
that demonstrates expertise. Alternatively, software companies can !give
away software as a way to sell systems integration or customized
application development.
A notable example of the use of cross-subsidization to sell services
is the free distribution of software as an avenue to sell technical support.
For example, Microsoft gives away its Internet Explorer browser without
a licensing fee, but users must purchase technical support. The sale of
technical support unbundled from the underlying software has become
increasingly popular.
8.
.1

PERSONAL INFORMATION COLLECTION AND DATA
MINING

Internet sites can easily collect a fair amount of information about
their users, much of it without the user's consent. For example, Internet
sites can learn the user's IP address and most recently visited' site.
Furthermore, by placing a unique identifier into the user's "cookie"4 6 (or,
with less precision, by analyzing the server logs), the Internet site can
trace the user's activity through the site and glean insights into what the
user looks at and for how long. In addition, many sites may request or

43. Rose Aguilar, Digital to Market Alta Vista, Mar. 29, 1996 <http://
www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,1005,00.html>.
44. This model may explain why companies tolerate unauthorized fan sites. Cf.
Constance Sommer, Film Rights Falling Through the Net, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEwS, Dec. 10,
1996, at 10E (referring to Disney's laissez-faire attitude toward on-line fan sites).
45. See Paulina Borsook, Music Lessons, UPSIDE, Mar. 1996 at 84, [hereinafter Borsook,
Music Lessons] (describing how music companies can add value to free on-line music
sufficient to induce purchases of CDs through better packaging, thicker CD booklets, and
accompanying video).
46. A "cookie" is a file on the user's hard drive where websites may store user-specific
information. Most browser software programs support the use of the cookie.
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require users to fill out registration forms which call for the disclosure of
extensive personal information.
Companies can then exploit this information for commercial gain in
a number of ways, such as selling email mailing lists to other companies
or selling advertising space to companies that want to provide users with
customized product offerings or page views based on their perceived
preferences.47 Although the commercial use of this personal information
can create some significant privacy issues, 48 such use is generally not
subject to legal restrictions in the United States.
9.
COMMUNITIES
The Internet is particularly useful for facilitating community
formation. In physical space, community formation may be inhibited by
geography, the cost of communication, or the asynchronous methods of
communication. On the Internet, however, groups can form quickly and
cheaply since these barriers are absent. Moreover, the absence of these
barriers may facilitate the formation of communities devoted to extremely
narrow topics, which otherwise would not form.
The formation of Internet communities offers one of the most
promising Internet business opportunities.
If an Internet site can
successfully attract like-minded people to interact with each other on the
site, it will have a number of ways to extract value from these
relationships.4 9 In addition to the obvious methods, such as selling the
demographics to advertisers and selling the mailing list to merchants
interested in reaching the target audience, the Internet site can extract
value by enhancing the community members' ability to communicate with
each other. The site could accomplish this by providing proprietary tools
to facilitate onsite communication and tools and methods to facilitate
and enrich physical-space meetings between members.
For example, WebGenesis <http://www.theglobe.com> provides
chat rooms oriented primarily towards young adults. While the general
public can access the chat rooms for free, subscribers receive "bonus"
onsite privileges, induding an onsite home page to which all their onsite
chat postings are hypertext linked automatically, access to private chat

47. See, e.g., CyberGold <www.cybergold.com> (a service which will pay users to read
advertisements sent to them based on their articulated preferences).
48. Cf. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October
1995
<http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/dataprot/directiv/directiv.html>
(discussing the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
the free movement of such data).
49. See Rebello, supra note 25, at 106 ("'[Community-building] is the secret weapon of
an electronic merchant."' (quoting Amazon.com founder Jeff Bezos)). See generally Arthur
Armstrong & John Hagel fI, The Real Value of On-Line Communities, HARV. Bus. REv., MayJune 1996, at 134.
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rooms available only to other subscribers (who presumably are also
dedicated chatters), and the ability to use tools such as Java that enhance
the chatting experience. In other words, by providing the chat rooms for
free, WebGenesis is able to identify those members of the communities
who desire a greater relationship to the community and target these
people for the sale of advanced onsite communications products.
Companies could also derive revenue opportunities from Internet
communities by organizing conferences and other events of interest to the
community. A site that forms a community dedicated to river rafting, for
example, could sell river rafting trips to its members, an endeavor that
would have the added value of creating an opportunity to meet other
members of the community in physical space.
10.

REINFORCEMENT OF PHYSICAL-SPACE MESSAGES

Internet sites can be used to reinforce marketing and sales efforts
being made elsewhere. Such reinforcement can occur in the form of
customer support and outreach, such as
Federal
Express'
<http://www.fedex.com>, use of its website to provide data tracking
services to its customers, or a software company's use of the Internet to
distribute bug fixes, FAQs, usage tips and other forms of customer
assistance.
Alternatively, some companies use Internet sites to increase
customer loyalty or provide branding opportunities."0 For example, the
websites prepared by Zima <http://www.zima.com> and Miller Genuine
Draft <http:/./www.mgdtaproom.com/> contain offerings designed to
allow their consumers to feel like the part of a community and to
encourage brand loyalty. The Internet market has been described as a
"relationship" market;"' free intellectual property can be the way to
initiate, build or reinforce the relationship.
C.

Importance of Attribution

As the prior section has indicated, companies can try a myriad of
methods of creating value by giving away intellectual property. However,
for cross-subsidization to work, buyers impressed with product X (freely
given away) must be led to product Y (for sale). In most cases, this will
mean that product X must give proper attribution to the seller of product
Y so that buyers can make the connection.

50. See Neil Gross & Peter McCoy, The Technology Paradox, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 6,
1995, at 76, 80 (describing how giving intellectual property away for free can build
mindshare in the coming "attention economy").
51. Id. at 77.
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U.S. copyright law affords no "right of attribution" to owners of
intellectual property distributed on the Internet.5 2 While some trademark,
unfair competition, or right of publicity theories may limit the ability of
the
users of intellectual property to falsely represent the origin 5of
3
intellectual property, there is no copyright obligation of attribution.
In some cases, attribution may be the only right that matters on the
In fact, an intellectual property owner seeking crossInternet.
subsidization may encourage people to "infringe" the intellectual
property through wide distribution, so long as attribution is given.54
Thus, existing copyright law lacks an important right, the absence of
which could hinder the deployment of key business models on the
Internet.
The NII White Paper recognized that attribution could be important
and therefore recommended that copyright law be amended to "prohibit
the provision, distribution or importation for distribution of copyright
management information known to be false and the unauthorized removal
or alteration of copyright management information." 5 The White Paper
defines copyright management information as the name of the copyright
owner and the terms and conditions for use of the work. 6
52. 17 U.S.C. § 106A applies only to "visual works," which include paintings,
drawings, prints or sculptures in a limited edition of less than 200 copies which are signed
and consecutively numbered, or a still photo raphic image which is a single coFy signed b
the author or is a limited edition of less than 200 copies signed and consecutively numbered
Id. § 101. While it theoretically possible for a work existing on the Internet to be
categorized as such, this possibility is highly remote.
53. None of the six exclusive rights of copyright have been interpreted to require
See Mark A. Lemley, Rights of Attribution and Integrity in On-line
attribution.
Communications, 1995 J. ON-LINE L. art. 2 <http://warthog.cc.wm.edu/law/publications/
jol/lemley.html>.
54. See John S. Erickson, Open Commerce through Enhanced Attribution (1996)
<http://www.netrights.com/EnhancedAttribution.html>; cf. Borsook, Music Lessons,
supra note 44, at 84 (describing how a musical group used the name of a Japanese character
for one of the group's songs; the litigation over the use of the name was amicably settled
when the group pointed out that the character owner could not buy the kind of free
advertising it had received).
Some of the business models, such as advertising, may require the attribution to occur
only on the site where the advertising is located. Therefore, not every business using crosssubsidization will necessarily encourage widespread infringement.
55. NI1 WHtrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 235. See also Julie A. Cohen, Some Reflections on
Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
161 (1997) [hereinafter Cohen, Copyright Management Systems] (discussing policies
prohibiting alteration of copyright management information).
56. Id. The reference to terms and conditions of use may be problematic because it
suggests that owners can unilaterally impose "contract" terms on all consumers of the file.
See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Management
in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) [hereinafter Cohen, Right to Read
Anonymously]. While this unilateral contract approach might be the right result, as found
in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), available at <http://
www.kentlaw.edu/7circuit/1996/jun/96-1139.htm>, no consensus currently exists that
the federal government should be dictating that licensors should be permitted to unilaterally
impose contract terms on licensees. See U.C.C. proposed Article 2B (Mar. 21, 1997 draft)
<http://www.lawlib.uh.edu/ucc2b/> (a controversial attempt to develop model state
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While not adopted into law in the United States, a virtually
identical proposal was adopted at the proceedings of the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"). 7 Time will tell if the treaty
will be adopted without changes in the United States.
The White Paper proposal and the WIPO treaty represent an
important step toward the recognition of the right of attribution in the
United States. However, the proposed law could have profound effects
on some current Internet practices.5 8 First, website operators commonly
incorporate content maintained on remote servers into the pages delivered
59
to users through a direct hypertext link to the remote content.
Intellectual property owners whose files are linked this way may object
(1) because these direct-linked users do not actually visit their site, and
(2) because the file may be displayed so as to suggest that the site
providing the link is the source of the file. Does this form of direct linking
run afoul of the White Paper's proposal? Should it? Would it matter if
the linked-to site provided a notice denying access to others who
attempted to link to the site? 60
Second, robots and agents can, for example, survey multiple search
engines and display the search results to the end user in summary form,
without displaying any advertising contained on the search engine's site
(or, for that matter, giving any attribution to the search engine).6 As a
legislation permitting increased ease in the formation of unilateral contracts by licensors);
See also Maureen O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 71 (1997). This issue is particularly important
because presumably the licensor-imposed terms will exceed the hcensor's rights under
copyright law
(otherwise,
whywould ifthey
impose grants
them?).of However,
and
licensor's terms
copyright
theyneed
wereto merely
would
be less problematic
conditions
rights (i.e., "you may use this material for any noncommercial use").
57. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Diplomatic Conference on Certain
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, WIPO Copyright Treaty (Dec. 23, 1996)
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm>; World Intellectual Property
Organization, Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights
Questions,
WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty
(Dec. 23,
1996)
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/95dc.htm>.
See also Cohen, Copyright
Management Systems, supra, note 56 at 161, 165-69.
58. Prof. Samuelson also notes that the proposal could protect devices incorporated,
into files that effectively report on users' behavior, raising potentially serious privacy
concerns. Samuelson, supra note 3, at 188; See also Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously,
supra note 56.
59. The HTML command "img src," followed by a URL, instructs the user's browser
software to access the file contained at the referenced URL and to incorporate that file into
the page displayed to the user. The user will see the file displayed on the page, but the user
will not see the site from which the file originated, nor will the linking site store a copy of
the linked-to file on its server. Issues related to linking are discussed in part VI.D.1, infra.
60. Cf CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 3, 1997), availableat <http://www.bna.com/e-law/cases/compusl.html> (discussing
how when a mass email sender was notified by CompuServe that their "junk" email was no
longer welcome, the sender's continued sending of mass emails was a trespass to chattels;
however, notice "may be insufficiently communicated to potential third-party users when it
is merely posted at some location on the network.").
61. See, e.g., SavvySearch <http://williams.cs.colostate.edu:1969/>.
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result, the search engine sites must bear the costs of providing the service
without getting the anticipated benefits from the consumers of the
information. Does this type of robot behavior run afoul of White Paper's
proposal? Should it? Would it matter if the search engine's site
contained a notice that notified others that robots and agents were not
welcome?
D.

Conclusion

The large number of alternative business models presented above is
necessarily incomplete; entrepreneurs have proven highly capable of
developing new ways of extracting value from the Internet. However, the
mere existence of so many alternatives reinforces the fundamental
message: intellectual property creators can cross-subsidize the production
of their works in many ways.
The impact of this concept is powerful: if even one person is able to
produce and freely distribute a type of intellectual property through
cross-subsidization, why would consumers continue to pay for an
equivalent work? While each copyrightable creation is theoretically
unique, many types of intellectual property have substitutes which
consumers would readily choose if they were available for free.6 2 In other
words, if the Internet is a relatively efficient market and intellectual
property is somewhat fungible, then the free availability of a type of work
should establish the market price for that type of intellectual property at
zero.

63

The implications of this proposition are truly profound. It suggests
that intellectual property owners who expect to be paid directly by end
users will face extreme competitive pressures. A single entrepreneur able
to cross-subsidize the production of substitute intellectual property
should theoretically drive the market price to zero and eliminate all
prospects that end users will directly pay for the intellectual property.
Given the plethora of methods an entrepreneur could use to achieve this
result, zero pricing may be inevitable for many classes of intellectual
property.

A recent case involving the use of "frames" raises similar issues which arise when one
site engages in "free riding" on the efforts of other sites. See Washington Post Co. v.
Totalnews, Inc. (complaint filed Feb. 20, 1997) <http://www.jx.com/internet
/complain.ht-l>. However, Totalnews does provide attribution to the sites it frames.
62. But see Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 56 (assuming that each
intellectual property is unique to the point that owners are able to exercise monopoly
powers sufficient to impose unfair terms on consumers seeking access to the work).
63. See generally Gross & McCoy, supra note 50 (describing the recurring phenomenon
of valuable goods and services being given away for free, even where manufacturing and
distribution have marginal costs).
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However, some categories of intellectual property almost certainly
will not be given away for free." For those categories that will support
user payments, entrepreneurs can deploy various technologies to protect
their intellectual property and increase the likelihood of payment. These
technologies are discussed in part VI.
SOCIOLOGY OF THE INTERNET
While business and technological factors significantly impact the
market for intellectual property, some noteworthy features about users'
attitudes towards intellectual property also warrant attention. This
section describes certain sociological aspects of the Internet culture and
how they may influence users' willingness to pay.
V.

Attitudes Towards Intellectual Property
Attitudes towards intellectual property can be placed on a
spectrum ranging from "intellectual property should not be protected" to
"intellectual property should be highly protected." Though not discrete
65
nodes, five distinguishable segments of this spectrum can be identified:
A.

1.

INFORMATION WANTS TO BE FREE

Adherents to this perspective believe that any intellectual property
should be in the public domain and available for all to use. While finding
dogmatic adherents to this perspective may be difficult, finding people
who believe that anything they find on the Internet is "fair game" for free
use is relatively easy.
2.

RIGHT OF ATTRIBUTION

Adherents to this perspective believe that intellectual property can
be freely "infringed" so long as the source is attributed. Again, though it
may difficult to find people who strictly adhere to this perspective, it is
very easy to find people-even among creators of intellectual propertywho subscribe to this perspective at least some of the time. Interestingly,
U.S. copyright law rarely requires attribution (see part IV.C, supra),
although netiquette usually encourages it.

64. Which categories these are is presently unclear, but presumably they will be
categories lacking high fungibility between specific intellectual property outputs.
65. See Lance Rose, Is Copyright Dead on the Net?, WIRED, Nov. 1993, at 112, availableat
<http://www.hotwired.com/wired/1.5/departments/idees.fortes/copyright.on.net.htm>
(discussing various visions of what copyright law means on the Internet).
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LIMITED USE OF WORKS SUBJECT TO COPYRIGHT
Adherents to this perspective believe that intellectual property
creators should have protectable rights in their creations, but they do not
believe that these rights are absolute. Often, adherents want to strike a
interests and permitting
balance between protecting creators'
"infringement" of the intellectual property in a manner consistent with
This position arguably represents the
their lifestyle or business.
framework for existing U.S. copyright law, which gives significant
protection to copyright holders but provides the fair use defense and
statutory exemptions.
3.

4.

MORAL RIGHTS

"Moral rights" are the rights of the author to be attributed as the
6 6 As
author of the work and to object to a particular use of the work.
between the author and any potential user (induding assignees or
licensees), this perspective strongly favors the author; often the author
cannot assign his or her rights, and in some jurisdictions the author
cannot waive the enforcement of his or her moral rights.67 Generally,
moral rights reflect a belief that the author's creations are an extension of
the author, and therefore the author can control how the public views
author through his or her creations. U.S. copyright law does not explicitly
68
recognize moral rights except in a very limited set of circumstances.
STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Adherents to this perspective believe that the author should have
significant power to control the use of his or her intellectual property.
Adherents would extend the author's power beyond moral rights and
permit the author to control all uses of his or her work.
5.

From a policy perspective, it is useful to think about how our
copyright laws can conform the behavior of people who subscribe to the
perspectives outlined above. Importantly, people who subscribe to the
"information wants to be free" theory may very well abuse copyright
restrictions regardless of the strength of intellectual property laws, in
which case strengthening copyright laws to conform their behavior serves
little purpose. 69 To the extent that the Internet culture has increased the
number of people unsupportive of strong intellectual property rights, new

66. See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Paris Text 1971), § 6bis <http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/6bis.html>.
67. See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 146.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
69. See Rose, supra note 15, at 104.
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copyright laws designed to increase creators' rights are unlikely to
produce the desired results.
B.

Internet Culture and Micro-Infringements

Historically, the Internet has been populated by academics and
technologists, many of whom would properly be categorized in the
"Information Wants to be Free" segment (or perhaps the "Right of
70
Attribution" segment) of the intellectual property attitude spectrum.
While waves of newcomers to the Internet have diluted this culture, many
of these newcomers bring complementary attitudes towards intellectual
property.
Take, for example, people under the age of thirty. During most or
all of their life, they have had easy access-often in their home-to a
number of devices they could use to infringe copyrights: audio cassette
recorders (and cheap blank tapes); video cassette recorders (and again
cheap blank tapes); high quality, low cost photocopy machines; fax
machines; and perhaps the most powerful copying device of all, the
personal computer (and cheap blank disks and hard drives). As a result,
the under-thirty generation has grown up being able to freely expropriate
intellectual property easily and at little cost. 7 1 As college students, how
many of them bought most (or even some) of the software on their
computer, rather than "borrowing" it from their folks or from a friend
down the hall? How many of them put together a compilation tape of
their favorite songs? How many of them made a cassette tape of
someone else's music album? What mechanisms are in place-or could be
put into place-to effectively convince these people that these acts are
impermissible under the existing system?
The early Net users and the under-thirty crowd appear to have
combined to create an interesting psychology on the Internet. The Internet
community reacts with widespread disbelief when someone tries to assert
that web browsing is an infringement, 72 that linking to a third party's
materials is an infringement, 73 that forwarding an email to a mail list
could be copyright infringement, 74 or that setting up a fan site could be an

70. See Rebello, supra note 25, at 113-14.
71. Cf. Litman, supra note 16, at 34-35 ("Most of us can no longer spend even an hour
without colliding with copyright law. Reading one's mail or picking up one's telephone
messages these days requires many of us to commit acts that [the NII WHrrE PAPER] now tells
us ought to be viewed as unauthorized reproductions or transmissions.").
72. See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 64-65.
73. See The Shetland Times Ltd v. Wills, Court of Sessions, Edinburgh, October 24,
1996 <http://www.shetland-news.co.uk/opinion.html> (a United Kingdom court enjoined
one newspaper from hypertext linking to stories at a competing newspaper's website).
74. See Mitch Betts, On-line Pay Per View, COMPUTERWORLD, June 5, 1995, at 58,
available at
<http://www.computerworld.com/search/AT-html/9506/950605SL22
rights.html> (citing a survey of 255 information systems professionals which indicating
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infringement. 75 Conceivably, the Internet community could be educated to
understand why these actions implicate copyright rights, but changing the
state of the Internet to conform to expansive readings of the copyright
law would cause major upheaval. Furthermore, the logistics involved in
trying to police these "micro-infringements" are daunting, and perhaps
not efficient from a social cost versus social benefit standpoint.76 Indeed,
such an approach could ultimately prove economically counterproductive
for intellectual property owners as well.7 7
More generally, the combination of the Internet culture and the
general effect of technological evolution may be affecting our collective
attitudes toward intellectual property. We have become a culture largely
serial micro-infringements. Generally, we want to
comfortable
respect other with
people's intellectual property rights, but we also want to
run our lives in a way that ultimately results in numerous minor, almost
trivial, but still theoretically actionable infringements.78 The effect of
trying to try to apply copyright laws (or worse, to try to strengthen them)
to overcome this attitude would likely be regressive.
Conditioning to Expect Freebies
Because so many intellectual property owners are giving away
valuable intellectual property for free, users are becoming conditioned to
expect free intellectual property everywhere they go. In this environment,
users become very reluctant to pay for intellectual property, since they
know that free substitutes are likely to be available elsewhere. Even
minor non-cash impediments, such as required registration forms, may be
sufficient to drive users away. This conditioning makes it increasingly
C.

that 72% believed they "should be able to download on-line news articles and share them
with as many people as they want").
. 75. For example, when Lucasfilms, the owner of Star Wars, contacted a dedicated fan
who had established a Star Wars appreciation website regarding alleged infringements, the
fan transcribed the conversation and posted the transcription on the website. After
Lucasfilms was flooded "with angry emails, demanding to know how it could presume to
assert such totalitarian control over a product some fans had woven into the very fabric of
their lives," Lucasfilms backed down. Sommer, supra note 44, at 10E.
76. See Wylie, supra note 37 ("Copyright doesn't work today because people pay 100
percent of the time. It works because people pay often enough that intellectual property
,owners make a profit."); cf. Borsook, supra note 45, at 84 (noting that the music industry
long ago accepted that it would lose 15-20% of its potential revenues to home copying).
'77. A good example can be found in the movie studios' action against video cassette
recorder manufacturers, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984),
where the studios' victory would have inhibited the development of an industry (video
cassette rental) that generated $13 billion in revenues for the studios in 1993. See Current
Revenue of Target Markets, UPSIDE, Dec. 1994 at 18 (graph referencing a Yankee Group
study); cf. Litman, supra note 16, at 46 ("Whenever we have discovered or enacted a
copyright exception, an industry has grown up within its shelter.").
78. The Property of the Mind, ECONOMIST, July 27, 1996, at 57, 57. <http://www.
economist.iconnet.net/issue/27-07-96/wbsfl .html>.
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difficult for intellectual property owners to charge users directly for
intellectual property.
VI. TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODS FOR CONTROLLING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
This section analyzes existing technological tools and other methods
that enable intellectual property owners to protect their property.
Technology will by necessity play an essential role in the controlled
distribution of intellectual property on the Internet, despite the fact that
many categories of intellectual property will be made available to
consumers free of charge. Technology will help support revenueproducing markets in those categories of intellectual property that are not
going to be freely given away, and it may also help those intellectual
property owners who desire attribution.
Some people believe that the availability of the technologies
described in this section will lead to the development of a micropayment
economy, where even minor uses of intellectual property will result in
micropayments to the intellectual property owners. In addition to this
result being unlikely for the reasons described in part IV, micropayments
raise other difficult issues. In particular, the transaction costs of
micropayments can be relatively large-and any customer support is
likely to be too costly to provide.79
Clearly no single technology or method can prevent all forms of
infringement. However, it is both theoretically and practically possible
that a combination of technologies and other methods will provide
significant protection against unwanted infringement throughout the
productive life of the intellectual property. By setting up impediments to
infringement, the intellectual property owner can conform the behavior of
those who are unwilling to invest the extra effort to infringe. Furthermore,
while the pirates will have plenty of incentive to defeat the technology,
"technology does tend to favor the good guys because the good guys are
better funded."80
A.

Pre-Infringement
This section describes technologies and methods that copyright
owners may put into place before distributing their intellectual property
to control or inhibit infringement of their works.

79. Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, The Buck Starts Here, WIRED, August 1996 at 132, 134,
availableat <http://www.wired.com/wired/4.08/features/nanobucks.htm>.
80. Ross, supra note 15, at 137.
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1.

LIMITED FUNCTIONALITY

Under this approach, intellectual property owners provide a copy
of the work which is functionally limited. This approach provides one
way to technically implement the "try before you buy" and "sell the
For example, software creators can
upgrades" business models.
distribute software that cannot print or save. Under a slightly different
approach, a software vendor can distribute "buggy" software, such as
beta versions. While buggy software gives people the opportunity to use
and become familiar with it, buggy software also induces those who
desire stable software to purchase it. As a last example, database
providers or other vendors of large pieces of intellectual property can
deliver the content in small chunks, making it difficult to compile the
complete work.8 '
2.

DATE BOMB

Analogous to the limited functionality approach, under this
approach the intellectual property owner distributes fully functional
2
intellectual property but locks off access at a pre-specified date. Under
a variant of this approach, the vendor can lock off access after a certain
number of uses (i.e., after viewing the file 10 times, the file may no longer
be viewed).
3.

COPY PROTECTION

Under this approach, the vendor limits the number of times a file
can be copied. Copy protection was standard in the 1980s, but it fell
into disfavor largely because consumers resented the inconvenience and
because copy protection was relatively easy to break. 8 3 While users are
unlikely to be significantly more responsive to copy protection schemes
84
For
now, copy protection is currently being used in certain situations.
a
in
format
example, a creator can save a file in Adobe Acrobat's PDF
manner that prevents others from making copies, either directly or by
such indirect means as printing the screen or copying the text displayed
on the screen. 5 While this form of copy protection is probably not

81. Id. Compare the approach used by Lexis in delivering cases on a screen-by-screen
basis; compiling the full case by capturing each screen would be arduous.
SalesAgent <http://www.releasesoft.com/
82. See, e.g., Release Software's
sadiagram.html>.
83. Ross, supra note 15, at 136.
84. Cf. id. (describing how Macrovision "spoilers" are inserted into movies; the
spoilers confuse VCRs and produce distorted versions of the movies if copied).
85. Maximized Software's SiteShield software <http://www.maximized.com/
products/siteshield/> encodes files in such a way that they may be browsed but not
otherwise copied.
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"hack-proof," it is sufficient to inhibit the vast majority of users from
copying files.

86

ENCRYPTION ENVELOPES
4.
Encryption envelopes are software devices which encrypt
intellectual property in such a way that access can be obtained only by
using the proper key.87 These devices are often referred to by IBM's
trademark name "cryptolopes." Creators can protect their works by
distributing files in cryptolopes and requiring users to pay for keys that
remove the work from the envelope.
CONTRACTS
When
Contracts are an underrated pre-infringement control.
owners
to
restrict
property
intellectual
properly formed, contracts enable
the use of their intellectual property in excess of the rights granted under
copyright laws.8 8 An unresolved debate continues about the extent to
which on-line shrinkwrap contracts (sometimes referred to as
"clickthrough agreements") are enforceable.8 9 If such agreements are
enforceable, intellectual property owners may choose to rely heavily on
contract law to control the use of their intellectual property.
5.

B.

Metering

This section describes technologies and methods that intellectual
property owners can use to ensure payment prior to or at the time of a
consumer's use of the intellectual property.

86. "'Now, people say to themselves "Hey, let me take this for free," but with
[Maximized Software's SiteShield], they'd have to decide to be trespassers.... People
would have to put effort into stealing the images, and they'd know they were violating the
copyright."' Ross, supra note 15, at 139 (quoting Kenneth Spreitzer, president of
Maximized Software).
87. See <http://www.cryptolope.ibm.com/wiacc.htm>; See also Digital Delivery's
Sotware's
Portland
<http: //www.digitaldelivery.com/tbpage.html>;
TitleBuilder
ZipLock <http://www.portsoft.com/ziplock.html>.
88. In some circumstances the enforcement of the contract will be limited because the
contract provisions are preempted by copyright law. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (Sth Cir. 1988). See generally I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts,
Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1995)
<http:/www.urich.edu /-jolt/vlil/hardy.html>; See also, O'Rourke, supra, note 56.
89. Cf ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), available at
that
a
(holding
<http: //www.kentlaw.edu/7circuit/1996/jun/96-1139.htm>
shrinkwrap license, the functional equivalent of a "clickthrough" license, could constitute
a properly formed contract); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997)
1997
draft)
2B
(Mar. 21,
ProCD); U.C.C. proposed Article
(following
<http://www.lawlib.uh.edu/ucc2b/> (making it easier for licensors to form shrinkwrap
agreements with end users).
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1.

ACCESS CODES

Many of the devices described in the pre-infringement section can be
These devices permit users
coupled with "access code" devices.
"unlock" protective mechanisms embedded in intellectual properties
themselves, such as date bombs or functional limitations. This method
allows the intellectual property owner to meter usage of the intellectual
property, either by unlocking the intellectual property for a one-time
license fee or by requiring periodic procurement of access codes.
RIGHTS-MANAGEMENT ENVELOPES
As with encryption envelopes, the creator places intellectual
However, under this
property inside special software envelopes.
approach the envelope periodically communicates with a home base to
implement the business parameters imposed by the intellectual property
For example, Wave Interactive Networks <http://www.
owner.
winhome.com> provides a system which allows publishers to encrypt a
file as a .wxn file, which when activated causes the Wave plug-in to debit
the user's account maintained at Wave's website. 9
2.

3.

HARDWARE DEVICES.

Hardware device approaches require the user to acquire and install
the requisite hardware device. For example, using a debit card approach,
the user purchases a debit card that is pre-loaded with a certain amount
of value. After installation, the debit card is debited automatically as the
In a "superdistribution"
user consumes the intellectual property.
approach, the hardware device meters the usage of intellectual property
and automatically debits an account maintained at a central base.9 1 In
this way, even if the recipient has received a copy forwarded from a third
party, the hardware device can ensure payment to the intellectual
property owner.

90. See InterTrust <http://www.intertrust.com/products/flow.html> (describing the
DigiBox envelope, which communicates with a clearinghouse based on business rules
encapsulated in the envelope); Gary N. Griswold, A Method for Protecting Copyright on
Networks, 1994 <http://www.cni.org/docs/ima.ip-workshop/www/Griswold.html>
(describing a software envelope which requires periodic confirmation with a home base
prior to permitting further access); Stefik, supra note 2 (describing protocols to permit the
permanent transfer or temporary lending of files while holding the number of files to the
number actually paid for).
91. Brad Cox, Superdistribution, WIRED, Sept. 1994, at 89, available at
see
<http://www.hotwired.com/wired/2.09/departments/idees.fortes/superdis.html>;
Infosafe Systems <http://www.infosafe.com/> (offering both a hardware system and a
software-only system).
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DOWNLOADABLE EXECUTABLES

Downloadable executables, such as Java applets and ActiveX
scripts, are pieces of code which download from the server to the client
on a "use and discard" basis. In other words, the executable runs during
a particular session but will be flushed from RAM at the end of the
session. These executables can be metered out because they need to be
downloaded each session.
5.

CENTRALIZED COMPUTING

Under this approach, all of the executables, other than a user
interface on the client side, remain at the server. Therefore, the user's
computer must establish contact with the server each time the executable
is used, allowing the central computer to meter access. Centralized
computing is actually the old "timeshare" model used in the early days of
computing, when the client's processing power was so weak that
centralizing processing power at the server level was more efficient.
6.

DIGITAL CERTIFICATES

In the digital signature context, a certification authority issues to a
user an electronic file (a "digital certificate") which identifies the user as
the owner of a public key. However, digital certificates can be used to
certify more information than mere identity. For example, they can be
used to identify rights associated with a particular person. In these
ways, vendors can use digital certificates to control access to system
resources, including intellectual property files, by making files available to
users who can provide a digital certificate with specified rights (such
access, downloading, use, etc., including time limits). A user' would
obtain the digital certificate from either the vendor or a third party.
7.

COPYRIGHT CLEARINGHOUSES

Under this approach, intellectual property owners would vest
"clearinghouses" with the ability to license usage of their intellectual
property. A user would pay a license fee to such a clearinghouse to
Copyright clearinghouses
obtain rights to the intellectual property.
currently exist for music-related intellectual property, 92 although these are
products of statutory compulsory licensing. 93 No similar comprehensive

92. See ASCAP <http://www.ascap.com/ascap.html> and BMI <http://bmi.com/>.
93. 17 U.S.C. §§ 115 (making and distributing phonorecords), 116 (public performances
by means of coin-operated phonorecord players ( juke boxes").
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mechanisms have developed for other forms of intellectual property,9 4
despite some long-standing attempts to do so 9s and the widely
recognized benefits of having such a scheme in place. As a result, some
technological efforts are being made to include copyright management
information in all electronic files so that contact96information for procuring
copyright permissions will always be available.
SALE OF PHYSICAL COPIES
As anachronistic as it may sound, selling physical copies of
intellectual property remains a highly effective method of metering the
usage of intellectual property. While the electronic distribution of
intellectual property has many advantages, numerous advantages to
purchasing physical copies of works available on the Internet still remain.
First, many people still prefer reading physical copies over reading
electronic copies. Second, obtaining a mass-produced physical copy
rather than printing out the electronic copy may be beneficial from a cost
or quality standpoint. Third, in the case of large electronic files, obtaining
a physical copy may be more time-effective or convenient than
downloading the electronic copy. Fourth, the consumer may use devices
that have been optimized for use with physical copies, providing results
that exceed the results available from using the downloaded electronic
copy. Therefore, we should expect that certain categories of intellectual
property will continue to be demanded in physical versions.
8.

C.

Post-Infringement
This section describes technologies and methods that creators can
use to identify infringements and thus enhance enforcement of intellectual
property rights.
1.
AGENTS
Agents are programs that can implement specified commands
automatically. Intellectual property owners can used agents to search the
public spaces of the Internet to find infringing copies.9 7 While agent

94. The Copyright Clearance Center <http://www.copyright.com/> can grant licenses
to reproduce 1.75 mnillion documents-an impressive number, but clearly far short of the
overall set of works subject to copyright available in the world.
95. Project Xanadu, an attempt to ensure compensation to creators whenever even small
chunks of intellectual property are used, was initiated in 1960. Xanadu FAQ, § lb, June 29,
1996 <http://www.xanadu.com.au/xanadu/faq.html>.
96. See Seybold Report on Desktop Publishing, July 8, 1996 <http://www.
media.sbexpos.com/OldHotStories/960702.htm> (describing digital object identifiers and
the LicensIt product from NetRights).
<http://www(SCAM)
Mechanism
Copy
Analysis
Stanford
97. See
db.stanford.edu/-shiva/SCAM/scamlnfo.html>; see also Hyperstamps CyberGumshoe
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technology is still being developed and refined, even today creators can
perform a relatively powerful set of searches using full-text search engines
Vista
and Alta
<http://www.hotbot.com>
such as HotBot
<http://www.altavista.digital.com>.
STEGANOGRAPHY

2.

Steganography, as applied to electronic files, refers to the process of
hiding information in files in such a way that the hidden information is
not easily detected by the user. Intellectual property owners can use
steganography in a number of different ways on the Internet. One
approach is to insert into the file a "digital watermark" which can be
used to prove that an infringing file was the creation -of the intellectual
property owner and not the pirate.9 8 The owner of the work could also
store copyright management information using this technology. Another
approach is to encode a unique serial number into each authorized copy
of the file, enabling the owner to trace infringing copies to a particular
source.

99

3.

COPYRIGHT LITIGATION

Copyright litigation is a powerful tool for enforcing intellectual
property rights, one that should not be overlooked. While not every
infringement will be the subject of litigation, the threat of litigation helps
Copyright litigation not only
keep large pirate operations in check.'
helps the intellectual property owner obtain relief for specific acts of
infringement, it publicly warns others of the dangers of infringement.
Indeed, a number of intellectual property owners have had well-

Services <http://www.hyperstamps.com/misc/gumshoe.html> (offering a robotic, search
of the Internet for documents containing serialized document numbers that developers may
insert (for a cost) into an HTML page); Intellectual Protocols' Copysight
<http://www.ip2.com/copysight.cgi> (offering a service similar to Hyperstamps); cf.
MarkWatch <http://www.marwatch.com/> (providing an automated monitoring service
for trademark usage on the Internet); Alex Alben, The Death of Copyright in a Digital World:
The Reports are Slightly Exaggerated, ENT. LAW REP., July 1995 (describing. "bounty
hunter" programs used by intellectual property owners to cut down on infringements;
third-party attorneys bringing suits against infringers were allowed to keep any damages
won in the actions).
FBI
Highwater
<http://www.digimarc.com/-digimarc/>;
Diimarc
98. See
<http://www.highwaterfbi.com/>; SysCoP <http://syscop.igd.fhg.de/>; Argent, a
product created by the Palo Alto startup Dice (reported in Ross, supra note 15, at 139).
Tests have indicated that digital watermarks are resilient enough to survive most editing
and are still discernible after numerous reproductions. Ben Long, Watermarking Makes
16,
available at
at
1996,
Oct. 21,
Impression on Photos, MACWEEK,
<http://www.macweek.com/mw_1040/ga-watermark.html>.
99. David Voss, Stop That Copy, WIRED, Aug. 1994, at 34, available at
<http://www.hotwired.com/wired/2.08/departments /electric.word.html>; see also Jim
Warren, GovAccess.107, March 12, 1995 <http://www.eff.org/ftp/Publications/Ejournals/GovAccess/govaccess.107> (describing a similar approach).
100. See Borsook, Steal This Article, supra note 41.
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D.

Additional Problems Under Copyright Law Possibly
Solvable by Technology
This section discusses some additional complex issues under U.S.
copyright law that are not fully addressed by the technologies and
methods described in parts VI.A-C, supra, but are still addressable by
technology. In particular, linking and caching are both techniques used in
the normal functioning of the Internet, yet their permissibility under U.S.
copyright law is unclear.
When the technologies available for controlling linking and caching
are combined with the technologies and methods described in parts VI.AC, supra, the mosaic of the overall set of protection technologies and
methods available to intellectual property owners becomes clearer. This
clarity will lead to the question, discussed in part VI.E, infra, of whether
situations exist the intellectual property owner should have the
obligation-if he or she wants to exercise it-to prevent users from
infringing before the owner is given the right to claim infringement.
1.

LINKING

Hypertext linking is one of the blessings of the Internet, but its
application has proven problematic. Most copyright experts generally
believe that linking should -ot lead to copyright liability, 10 2 because the
mechanical operation of the hypertext link does not implicate one of the
exclusive rights of copyright owners; a hypertext-linked URL is merely an
instruction which is loaded into the user's browser software, and the
browser software does all of the work from there. As a result, the server
providing the hypertext link never makes a copy or otherwise processes
any of the data from the linked site.'0 3

101. See Lance Rose, The Copyright Escalator of Fear, BOARDWATCH, Nov. 1994 at 92,
(describing $500,000 settlement reached in Playboy v. Event Horizons BBS), available at
<http://www.boardwatch.com/november/LEGALLY.htm>; COMPUTER INDUSTRY LITIG.
REP., Jan. 4, 1996 at 21634 (reporting on a $600,000 settlement reached in Sega of America
v. The Ghetto); Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993), available at
<http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/frena.txt>; Sega v. MAPHIA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
1996) <http://www.bna.com/e-law/cases/sega2.html>; Sega v. Sabella, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20470 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1996).
There have also been well-publicized criminal indictments, including actions against
Davey Jones Locker, Rose, supra note 15, at 104, and Rusty & Edie's BBS, Michael A.
Hobbs, ACLU Cries Foul in Computer Raid, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 19, 1993 at 3B.
102. See, e.g., James Evans, Internet Issue: Use of the Web Raises Copyright Concerns,
L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 9, 1995, at 1.
103. If browsing the Web is an infringement because a copy of the page is made and sent
to the user's computer, as proposed by the NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 2 at 64-65, then the
linking site has arguably committed contributory infringement by substantially
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While the plain language of the copyright statute suggests the above
conclusion, commentators, to ensure that linking is not copyright
infringement, have argued that uploading intellectual property to the
Internet grants an "implied license"" 4 to link. Alternatively, linking might
be considered fair use.
Of course, given the alternative business models discussed earlier, in
many cases Internet sites eagerly seek out linking as an entree to generate
ancillary values. In fact, a nascent business of providing links has
developed.' 5 However, if an Internet site does desire to keep others from
linking to some or all of its pages, a number of technologies are available
to inhibit linking:
* The system operator (the "sysop") can make the page a
"dynamic" page by building the page only when the user causes the
execution of a program resident on the server. This prevents linking
because dynamic pages have no fixed reference point to which to
link. This technique, while effective, is also currently somewhat
expensive. Alternatively, the low-technology approach is for the
sysop to manually change the page's URL periodically, so that any
links made to the page will become ineffective.
* If the sysop desires to prevent a specific site from linking to a
page, the sysop may code the page in such a way that it refuses
browsers who access the site from the forbidden linking site." 6
o In the case of automatic linking performed by robots and spiders
(such as those used by the search engines), the sysop may load
information into the header of the page that instructs the robots and
spiders not to index the page.
o The page can be password protected, although this practice
inhibits the page's free accessibility to people browsing the Internet.

contributing to the user's infringement (which occurred during the process of browsing).
See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway:
The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 345, 353-56 (1 95), available at <http://yul.yu.edu:80/csl/journals/aelj/articles/
13-2/elkin.html>. The assertion that browsing is an actionable infringement has met strong
criticism. See id. at 354; Samuelson, supra note 3, at 137.
104. Although the term "implied license" is frequently bandied about on the Internet, the
concept is rather amorphous under copyright law. At its heart, an implied license is an
estoppel doctrine, arising because the infringing party detrimentally and justifiably relied
on the intellectual property owner's actions.
105. SeeR. Lee Sullivan, Toll Booths on the Info Highway, FORBES, March 25, 1996, at
118.
106. See Maximized Software's SiteShield <http://www.maximized.com/products/
siteshield/> (providing a product that prevents linking from all URLs other than those on
the specific website); Kristi Coale, Intellecast Smartens Up to Banner Bypass, WIRED NEWS
<http:/ /www.wired.com/news/technology/story/2844.html>
1997)
28,
(Mar.
(describing how Intellicast, a weather site, prevented links to its weather maps which
bypassed the associated banner advertisements).
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0 To address the problem of unattributed graphics being
incorporated into pages on a remote system, the graphic may
contain a program that automatically causes a notice to appear to
users who access it that the graphic is the copyrighted work of the
1 7
intellectual property owner.
2.

CACHING

Caching is a loosely used term that generally refers to the process of
making an extra copy of a file or set of files for more convenient retrieval.
On the Internet, caching of third party files can occur both locally on the
user's client computer (either in RAM or on the hard drive) or at the
server level (called "proxy caching"). When a user requests a file that has
been cached, the browser will deliver the file from the cache rather than
retrieving a fresh copy over the Internet.
Although different concepts, similar issues to caching arise with
mirroring (establishing an identical copy of an Internet site on a different
server), archiving (providing an historical repository for information, such
as with newsgroups and mail lists, where the proceedings would
otherwise be evanescent), and full-text indexing (the copying of a
document for loading into a full text or nearly full-text database which is
searchable for key words or concepts).
Caching is an integral part of the Internet's operation, in part
because it speeds the user's access to files and in part because it reduces
the infrastructure required for operation of the Internet (by reducing the
number of files that must be transferred using the infrastructure).
Without caching, our already taxed infrastructure would be even more
clogged, to the point where it may become unworkable. As a result, a
number of serious business plans have been predicated on using
caching. 10 8

107. This is one of the features of the Copysight service from Intellectual Protocols
<http://www.ip2.com/copysight.cgi>.
108. For example, @home <http://www.home.net> is deploying a network that permits
users to use high-speed cable modrns for Internet access. So that users will experience
cable modem speeds as often as possible, @home will cache (or archive or mirror, depending
on the terminology) the entire Internet on regional servers to which users will connect via
their cable modems.
The recent start-up Marimba <http://www.marimba.com/> uses caching as a way to
make the use of Java programs more robust.
Also, the number of offline browsers is growing. Offline browsers are software that
automatically download some or all of an Internet site to the user's computer, allowing the
user to browse without having to wait for the delivery of each page. See, e.g., WebEx
WebWhacker
<http://www.ffg.com/whacker/index.
<http://www.gowebex.com>,
hhtm>, InContext Flashsite <http://www.incontext.com/products/flashsite/ index.html>
<http://www.documagix.com/products/
DocuMagix
HotCargo
Express
and
hotcargoexpress/welcome.html>.
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However, caching could cause harm because the copies in the cache
are not necessarily the most current and up-to-date copies. 10 9 For
example, users relying on the cached copy may unwittingly use out-ofdate material; similarly, harms such as defamation or infringement that
existed on the original page may propagate for years until flushed from
each cache where they have been replicated."' Also, since caching is an
infringement under a literal reading of U.S. copyright law, either caching
must be the subject of an implied license or fair use defense or it is (at
least theoretically) actionable.
Internet sites can deploy a number of technologies to restrict or
prevent caching:
* Sysops can make the page a "dynamic" page by building the
page only when the user causes the execution of a program resident
on the server. As in the case of linking, this solution may be
expensive.
* Sysops may place information on the page's header which tells
the party trying to cache the page when to replace the copy in the
cache with a new copy (this is called an "expiry header"). In the
case of a sysop who does not want the page cached at all, the
sysop merely sets the expiry date as a date before the date on
which the information is loaded. Unfortunately, no technology
standards presently exist under which caching entities can read and
manage this process automatically, so a sysop's instructions may
well be ignored or not processed.
* The page can be password protected, although again this inhibits
the page's free accessibility to Internet browsers.
Finally, parties trying to establish caches have an incentive: to
deploy software that automatically updates the cache every time the
cached page changes. While this practice solves many of the problems, it
leaves control of the process with the entity doing the caching rather than
with the website being cached.
E.

Is Technology a Substitute for Copyright Law?

Many on the Internet implicitly believe that the failure of an
intellectual property owner to use available technology to prevent
infringement controls grants to all comers an implied license to infringe.

109. See Lisa
Sanger, Caching on the Internet, Spring 1996
<http://
seamless.seamless.com/eric/cache.html>; Eric Schlachter, Cache-22, INTELL. PROP. MAG. OF
THE RECORDER, Summer 1996, at 15, availableat <http://www.ipmag.com/schlacht.html>.
110. Toys R Us v. Akkaoui, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996)
(describing injunction granted in favor of a trademark owner against an infringing website
requiring the website to notify all publishers of directories or lists to remove reference to,
the website and to flush all references to the website from their caches).
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This attitude is seen most often in the arguments raised against copyright
infringement for linking and caching. However, based on all of the
possible technological controls available to intellectual property owners
as described in this part VI, the "use technology or accept infringement"
argument might be expanded to apply to all types of infringement, going
far beyond just linking and caching.
In some ways, this argument is unprecedented. No other situation
come to mind where a copyright owner's failure to use technological
protective controls has the effect of diminishing their rights under
copyright law."' Why should the Internet create a new paradigm?
On the other hand, the normal functioning of the Internet is
predicated on multiple infringements of copyright rights. If we want the
Internet to work as it currently operates and as it can operate in the
future, we must reduce the chilling effect of the threat of copyright
litigation by changing the rules (or interpreting them differently) or placing
some burden on intellectual property owners to "opt out" of the system
by deploying technology controls.
Given that many intellectual property owners' business models are
based on encouraging "infringement" by users, and that many users
believe (innocently but mistakenly) that intellectual property found on the
Internet is free for the taking, a trend is emerging toward increasing the
burden placed on intellectual property owners to adopt technology
controls rather than relying on copyright infringement litigation.
the efforts of those seeking to
Interestingly, this trend is incompatible with
1 12
increase the scope of the copyright laws.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even though many of this article's specifics will be out-of-date soon
after it is published, its general conclusions should have lasting relevancy
to the policies of future U.S. copyright law. This article has marshaled
evidence to support the following conclusions:
* The creation and dissemination of intellectual property, both on
the Internet and more generally, seems highly robust despite all of
the threats.
* The economics of the Internet dictate that, in many cases,
businesses must find a way to generate revenues without charging
users for intellectual property.

111. A different analysis might apply in regard to trade secret and trademark law. In
the case of trade secrets, the owner must use efforts, whether technological or otherwise, to
keep the information secret in order to preserve the information's status as a trade secret.
In the case of trademarks, the owner must use quality control, whether technological or
otherwise, to maintain the trademark.
112. See, e.g., NII WHrrE PAPER, stipra, note 2, at 7-17.
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e A wide variety of sustainable business models permit businesses

to accomplish that end.
* Users are becoming increasingly unwilling to pay directly for
intellectual property.
e The elimination of all infringements is an impossible and possibly
undesirable goal.
- A cadre of entrepreneurs and existing companies are introducing
a wide variety of technologies that intellectual property owners can
use to manage the process of infringements.
* The perception is increasing that intellectual property owners
should be required to use the available technological tools rather
than relying on the threat of litigation over micro-infringements.
As a practical reality of these conclusions, the real battle between
intellectual property owners and Internet users is being waged using the
business models and technological tools available to intellectual property
owners. Combined with the trends in sociological beliefs about the
Internet, the business models and technological tools will evolve over time
to make copyright law increasingly less important as a tool for
conforming behavior on the Internet.
Concluding that copyright law's unimportance on the Internet
suggests that copyright law should be abolished generally would be
inaccurate. The fact that the existing copyright laws may have no effect
on the way creators and consumers operate on the Internet does not mean
that we no longer need these laws. Existing copyright laws are critically
important to the world of physical space.' 13 This holds true even though
the Internet may become the preeminent vehicle for the dissemination of
intellectual property.
However, except in the possible case of attribution rights, no new
laws designed to increase the rights of intellectual property owners on the
Internet are currently needed. Any such legislation would most likely
destroy the delicate balance being struck in the marketplace right now.
Furthermore, any anomaly in the existing laws is likely to be resolved by
technological and business innovation, which is occurring at a dizzying
rate.
We live in an energizing information age, where we are beginning to
realize many of yesterday's dreams about information exchange on a

113. At least two important exceptions to this general statement exist. First, the
conclusion that loading a copy into RAM is an infringement creates a great deal of
uncertainty for browsing. At a minimum, clarifying that browsing is not an actionable
infringement would be helpful. Second, although generally a topic outside the scope of this
paper, the conclusion reached in some cases that sysops are directly liable for copyright
infringements occurring because users upload works subject to copyright onto their system
has caused a great deal of consternation. If as a policy matter a consensus exists that
sysops should not be liable in this circumstance, statutory clarification would be useful.
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global scale. We should facilitate this environment by letting the
marketplace reach its own equilibrium. We can do this best by pursuing
legislation which regulates only the most extreme behavior, leaving the
rest of the spectrum of behavior for marketplace solutions.
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